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Abstract
Theories of relations between language and conceptual development benefit from empirical
evidence for concepts available in infancy, but such evidence is comparatively scarce. Here, we
examine early representations of specific concepts, namely, sets of dynamic events
corresponding either to predicates involving two variables with a reversible, asymmetric relation
between them (such as the set of all events that correspond to a linguistic phrase like “a dog is
pushing a car,”) or to comparatively simpler, one-variable predicates (such as the set of events
corresponding to a phrase like “a dog is jumping.”). We develop a non-linguistic, anticipatory
eye-tracking task that can be administered to both infants and adults, and we use this task to
gather evidence for the formation and use of such one-and two-place-predicate classes (which we
refer to as event sortals) in 12-24-mo-old infants, and in adults with and without concurrent
verbal prose shadowing. Using visually similar stimuli for both the simpler (one-place) and the
more complex (reversible, asymmetric, two-place) concepts, we find that infants only show
evidence for forming and generalizing one-place event sortals, and, while adults succeed with
both kinds in the absence of verbal shadowing, shadowing hampers their ability to form and use
the asymmetric two-place event sortals. In a subsequent experiment with adults, we find that if
the shadowing material is grammatically impoverished, adults now succeed in forming and using
both one- and two-place event sortals. We discuss implications of these results for theories of
concept acquisition, and the role of language in this process.
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TITLE: The role of language in building abstract, generalized conceptual representations
of one- and two-place predicates: a comparison between adults and infants.

Most theories of conceptual development attempt to explain the ontogeny of concept
acquisition as an interaction between some primitive representations of infants’ perceptual
inputs, and some mechanisms for their analysis. These theories differ both in their proposals for
what constitutes the primitive representations; which range from sensory-motor representations
(e.g., Gallese & Lakoff, 2005) to agents, objects, and numbers (e.g., Spelke & Kinzler, 2007);
and what the mechanisms for analysis are, ranging from distributed, neural-network-like
computations (e.g., Shultz, 2012) to rational inference (e.g., Tenenbaum, Griffiths, & Kemp,
2006). Concurrently, developmental scientists have been cataloging empirical evidence for the
presence of concepts in prelinguistic infants (e.g., Carey, 2011 contains an overview of such
evidence in a variety of domains).
Language has long been recognized as an important factor that could contribute to
conceptual development due to its ability to create novel meanings, in part, by combining
previously known words and phrases in formal algebraic, syntactic structures; so that we can
immediately come to understand what it might mean if we hear someone tell us that they saw a
purple apple. Further, such novel creations are abstract, and can refer not just to immediately
perceptually available tokens, but also to sets, for example, of all apples that are purple. When
such creations become commonplace, we can even substitute them for single words; instead of
referring to ‘unmarried men,’ we just say bachelor, and if it were common in our milieu to fish
with one’s hands by groping under the stones or banks of a stream, then we could simply refer to
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each instance of such an event with the word guddling. In this sense, language is ideally suited
for the development of ad hoc, structured conceptual categories that are of functional relevance,
but which might not be innately specified.
The question we are interested in is, to what extent are our concepts reliant on language?
The development literature on prelinguistic infants’ innate knowledge of numbers, objects,
conspecifics, etc. alluded to above suggest that at least some concepts might be innately
specified. Could it be that language is required for the development of more complex concepts?
In this work, drawing on previous literature (detailed below), we propose that sets of
dynamic events involving two participants with an asymmetric relation involving both (e.g., a
dog pushing a car) are relatively complex compared to sets of dynamic events involving only one
participant (e.g., a jumping dog, with an irrelevant car beside it), and that the former might
require the support of language to be properly represented as a category. We seek empirical
evidence that can speak to this issue.

Situating this research project
The research described here falls between two existing bodies of work. On the one hand, its
roots lie in the literature on sortals in infancy. How does an infant acquire basic object level
sortals, namely the criteria for individuation (knowing how to divide and count objects) and
identity (knowing what properties a kind has) (Xu, 2007)? The surprising failure of
ten-month-olds’ representations is revealed in the sequential presentation of objects behind a
screen, where infants default to something like “physical object” to represent basic objects like
cup, truck etc. (for review, see Stavans, Li, Wu & & Baillargeon, 2019). By twelve months,
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infants seem to have more stable sortal criteria for many basic object level concepts, with shape
among the criteria. The failure is only in sequential presentation, in what have been called
‘event mapping paradigms’: it is not that infants fail to discriminate basic object level kinds
when they are presented together in space and time. Furthermore, the failures at ten months can
be overcome by the objects displaying (conceptually) different kinds of motion or functions
(Futó, Téglás, Csibra, & Gergely, 2010). Research also suggests that infants even at 9 months
distinguish sortals from broadly distinct ontological categories such as human versus nonhuman,
or animate versus inanimate (Surian and Caldi, 2010).
Events too have properties of individuation and identity, though they have not usually been
considered in this light (but see, e.g., Zacks & Tversky, 2001). Yet for the purposes of making
event descriptions in language, one needs to know when two events fall under the same
description and when they do not. And, it is possible to count events just as it is possible to count
object kinds (such as instances of guddling). A small but growing set of studies in this area,
beginning with Gordon (2003), uses habituation procedures with infants to ask what must change
for an event to be considered unlike the original. For example, Gordon asked infants at the end of
the first year of life what counts as an event of giving. In particular, do infants recognize which
aspects of the event are essential participants, namely the arguments, and which are not? Take
the event wherein a boy hands a girl a teddy bear. The giver and the recipient are essential, but so
also is the item transferred. At ten months, the infants noticed if the teddy bear was absent in a
later trial once they have habituated to this event. In a control, Gordon contrasted this with an
event of a boy hugging a girl in which the teddy bear was merely an adjunct to the main event.
Infants did not dishabituate when the teddy bear was absent from a subsequent event of hugging.
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The striking suggestion is that infants are already partitioning events into representational
structures that contain certain essential parts (arguments) and inessential (adjuncts), before
language even starts.

The second literature is on toddler’s attempts to map events onto semantic or syntactic
representations (discussed in greater detail in the next Section). In this literature the child is
shown a novel action event while also being provided with a verbal label, such as “Look,
gorping”. One question is about syntactic bootstrapping: can toddlers tell that a transitive
sentence maps to a causal event rather than a noncausal event? That is, “Look, the bear is
gorping the duck” should refer to the causal event involving the bear and the duck, rather than
the event in which both bear and duck are present but engaged in parallel actions like arm
flapping (Naigles, 1990). The second question is whether the children can tell which event to
attend to: should it be the bear doing something to the duck or the duck doing something to the
bear? That is, at what age can children map the syntactic subject onto the semantic class of agent,
and the syntactic object onto the semantic class of patient. In this literature, the prior conceptual
analysis of a given scene into agents and patients is generally assumed (but see Perkins 2019).
Golinkoff and Kerr (1978) found that toddlers aged 15 to 18 months noticed if the actors (two
men) switched thematic roles after habituation, when such scenes were presented without
accompanying language.
In Gordon’s studies, we do not know if the infant would notice if different boys and girls
were involved in the events, rather than the one pair shown to them. Can the infant form a
general, rather than a specific representation of the event during exposure? That is, is the event
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represented more generally like “Boy gives Teddy bear to Girl”, or more specifically like “This
one gives thing to that one”?
The findings by Gordon shows that prelinguistic infants can attend to the relevant
dimensions of a dynamic event, namely, which are the arguments and which are adjuncts when
multiple characters are involved. What is the limit on this? Do prelinguistic infants also see the
resemblance across these action events when the characters change identity? That is, can they
conceive of such events as sets, thereby allowing other events with different participants, sharing
the same linguistic description (“boy giving girl a toy”), to be recognized as similar events, when
they do not yet have access to the structures underlying such linguistic descriptions? Our work is
designed to address these issues.
What would motivate the formation of such a class of events? We might see someone
involuntarily grinding their teeth, and understand this dynamic event unfolding before us as
‘someone involuntarily grinding their teeth’ We might not (unless we were dentists) think of this
single event as a potentially infinite class of events. And yet, if we were dentists, then we would
think of this event as a member of a class of events, and we would even have our own special
name for it – bruxism.
We would also like to note here that when we use the term “event,” we recognize that these
occur at different levels of abstraction. “Pushing,” “giving,” “guddling,” occur, but also more
abstract and complex dynamic scenarios such as “accidents” and “funerals” or “football games”,
that may not only vary in participants but also are composed, either hierarchically or
sequentially, of a large number of individual actions. When these clusters occur often enough,
they are nominalized.
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In other words, whether or not we should represent a class of events would presumably
depend on a host of factors such as the utility of such a class. We are interested in the underlying
ability of being able to build such (novel) representational classes, and our specific question is,
does the representation of such classes rely on language?

Concepts that might (not) require language.
To begin examining the relation between language and concepts, de Villiers and colleagues
asked whether adults can form an implicit representation of a set of events that are alike, in the
sense that they are all true under the same linguistic description: “event sortals” by analogy with
object sortals. The methodology involved implicit concept formation in an eyetracker; that is,
adults were simply told to attend to what was happening but no instruction was given, and no
response was required. Critically, and in contrast to the experimental paradigms used to study
syntactic bootstrapping, there was no language used in any of the stimuli.
In each of a series of trials, participants viewed two side-by-side pictures on a screen. The
two pictures depicted a contrasting pair of events that differed in their linguistic descriptions, one
of which was designated the “target” for a given participant. For example, a participant in one
such experiment might have seen a pair of pictures depicting a monster chasing a dog and a dog
chasing a monster. On each trial the target event for that participant (e.g., monster chasing dog)
turned into an animation after three seconds. The question was, would participants confronted
with the initial pair of still pictures look in anticipation at the side of the one that would animate,
having extracted the rule that ties the events together?
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Importantly, the issue is not about whether a participant can “parse” the scene into a
monster, and chasing, and a dog. Nor is the question about whether the participant can see either
event as composed, for example, that the monster is the agent and the dog the patient. Instead, it
is a question about equivalence classes: can the participant come to recognize the set of such
events as a class to be distinguished from the other class in which the dog is the agent and the
monster the patient? Is there anything that motivates the existence of such a trained class except
for its equivalence in linguistic description? Notice that in order to come to appreciate the correct
event class and show successful anticipations, participants need to be able to hold in memory
some representation that allows a distinction between monster-as-agent events from dog-as-agent
events from previous trials.
In one such study de Villiers asked whether a participant could attend to the difference
across two sets of closely matched pairs of pictures, one in which a parent kisses a child, and the
second with the same participants, in which a child kisses a parent (de Villiers 2014). In short,
the content to be attended to is a reversible transitive event, with the tokens (the individuals)
constantly varying. Half of the participants were simultaneously engaged in a dual task, namely,
shadowing an audio book after a few minutes of pre-experiment practice. The other half watched
with no verbal interference. The results revealed that verbal interference disrupted the adult
participants’ ability to anticipate which of the two stills would animate. Comparing looking time
to target versus non-target for the non-shadowing group of subjects revealed highly significant
differences in looking time. In the absence of shadowing, adults easily learn to look in the
direction of the still that depicted the “same” event over trials, namely “adult kiss child”.
However, when verbally shadowing, adults did not look consistently at the correct still image, in
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fact they were reduced to chance levels. In the verbal shadowing condition, with language tied
up, these participants could not track the commonality across the events captured in the
propositional description. In a second experiment the stimuli were more tightly controlled
stimuli, of a schematic dog and monster engaged in chasing events, and the rule that tied the
targets together was “dog chase monster”. The results were replicated.
In other work, Nordmeyer (2011) working in the same lab and using the same procedure
with implicit anticipatory looking, tested whether adult participants could form a concept of
negation, i.e., not-p, looking at pairs of pictures in which the “negative” example animated. For
example, the pair might consist of a woman sawing wood, versus another woman standing with a
saw but not sawing. Another type of negation might be where something failed to happen, for
example, one set of images showed a match successfully lighting a fire, and in the negative case,
the match fizzled out. The shadowing participants in the negation task failed completely to
register the property that the negative stills had in common, looking equally often at target and
non-target. De Villiers (2014) and Nordmeyer (2011) argued that this was because the negative
pictures have nothing in common without language mediation.
Importantly, Nordmeyer (2011) also tested whether another abstract idea that is not in itself
propositional might show the same pattern. In the second experiment she tested whether adults in
the implicit concept formation experiment could differentiate a target that was a natural kind
versus an artifact. Pairs of pictures showed stimuli quite well matched in perceptual properties: a
sock versus a wooly bear caterpillar, a pile of pennies versus a pile of shiny rocks – but the target
that animated was in each case the natural kind. Looking time to the target versus the non-target
in the three seconds immediately prior to animation of the still constituted the measure, that is
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the anticipatory gaze at the right kind of stimulus. Despite the abstract nature of the contrast,
shadowers and non-shadowers alike easily distinguished the class of pictures that would animate
and looked in anticipation after a very few trials.
Crucially, Nordmeyer’s control can just as easily be considered a control condition for the
reversible transitive condition, in that the same basic design was used, and the same
methodology and participant group. This lends support to the finding that verbal shadowing
selectively interferes with the recognition of equivalence classes that depend on language. It is a
control against the criticism that shadowing is having an effect at some more general level like
distracting attention away from the task, or getting in the way of response selection. De Villiers
(2014) and Nordmeyer (2011; Nordmeyer & de Villiers, 2019) argue that some concepts have a
similarity that emerges at a linguistic level, dependent on propositions (either reversible
transitive events, or negation). When adults have full control of their language faculty these are
easily recognized as sets. These same sets cannot be integrated by participants whose language
faculty is tied up by verbal shadowing. But if the concept is not tied to linguistic formulation,
such as the fundamental distinction between natural kinds and artifacts, shadowing does not
disrupt the attentional processes needed to integrate across even these highly diverse events.
Such concepts, then, could be considered as potential candidate primitives in infant cognition.

The present study: comparing one- and two-place predicate computations in infants and
adults
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To summarize, concepts differ in their complexity, and the proposal is that simpler
concepts are likely to be those for which we can find evidence in prelinguistic infants, and whose
expression might not depend on language and its prodigious representational power. The critical
question is, is this representational power of language required for the development of more
complex concepts?
Consider again the reversible, two-place predicates described in the previous studies. To
understand that a dog is chasing a monster requires more than just a combination of dog,
monster, and chase. That is, even if the individual entities and the fact that it is a chasing event
are all understood by the viewer, a memory representation that can identify a separate future
event as an instance of this event must additionally include information about which kind was
the chaser, if they are to correctly identify such a future event and distinguish it from one in
which a monster is chasing a dog.
The previous adult studies, in particular those with two-place predicates, suggest that
such complex concepts might not be ontogenetically primitive, and might require language for
their development. Our primary goal here is to therefore investigate the developmental origin of
the observed difficulty with reversible two-place predicates.
Towards this end, we developed an eye-tracking paradigm that allows us to gather
comparable data with infants and with adults. Closely modeled on previous paradigms (e.g., de
Villiers, 2014), this eye-tracking study presents participants with pairs of events that differ in the
thematic role assigned to the members of each of two categories (dogs and cars), and tracks the
evolution of anticipatory looks towards the designated target event (e.g., “car pushes dog”)
across the trials of an experimental session. We further compare the performance of infants and
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adults with such two-place predicates to their performance with conceptually simpler, one-place
predicates (e.g., “the dog rolls”), using very similar dynamic stimuli. We expect to find better
performance with one-place, compared to two-place event generalizations.

Developmental characteristics of our infant population
We chose to examine 12-24-mo-olds. As we describe in detail in this section, this age
range is of particular interest for the following reasons:
1. By this age, infants have fairly sophisticated understanding of dynamic events with
two (or more) participants. As an important aside, several of these studies use
computer-animated stimuli, as in our research.
2. Specifically, infants by 15 months can discriminate between agents and patients when
presented with dynamic events (Golinkoff & Kerr, 1978).
3. While infants in this age range appear to have some idea about syntactic structures that
can support asymmetric two-place predicates; i.e., transitives in English, they nevertheless do not
show adult-like knowledge of such structures in production or comprehension. Children at the
two to three word sentence stage at 18 to 24 months rarely produce reversible transitive
sentences and evidence of comprehension of such sentences is weak even in two year olds,
though eye-gaze reveals some sensitivity to the agent (Gertner, Fisher, & Eisengart, 2006).
That is, throughout this age range we can be fairly certain that infants are able to
correctly identify individual stimulus videos as examples of dog-push-car or car-push-dog
events, but the typical linguistic representations that could be used to encode such scenes are
immature. If infants can nevertheless learn the contingency between a specific predicate such as
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car-push-dog and identify novel instances as belonging to this class, it would be evidence for a
prelinguistic representational system capable of representing the set of events corresponding to
cars pushing dogs without relying on linguistic (transitive) structures.
From a cognitive perspective, several researchers have shown that even infants as young
as 6-9 months of age appreciate the distinction between causal events (a ball striking another and
making the second ball move) and non-causal events (a ball moving towards another ball, and
the latter moving before the first reaches it; e.g., Leslie, 1982; Leslie & Keeble, 1987, Muentener
& Carey, 2010; Kominsky et al, 2017). Recently, these findings have been extended to 3-mo-olds
(Liu, Brooks, & Spelke, 2019), suggesting early developmental origins of understanding events
involving multiple entities.
Older infants are sensitive to the relation between syntactic structures of language and the
semantics of observed events (e.g., Fisher, 1996; Lidz, Gleitman & Gleitman, 2003;
Abbot-Smith, Lieven, & Tomasello, 2004; Lidz & Gleitman, 2004). It has been amply
demonstrated that toddlers at the end of their second year use linguistic cues – in particular, the
presence of multiple noun phrases in an utterance – to infer transitive structures, and therefore
map such utterances to dynamic events with a causal component. For example, Naigles (1990)
showed 24-month-olds scenes with a duck and a bunny where either the duck-bunny interaction
was causal (e.g., one tilting the other’s leg or causing the other to adopt a bent position) or
non-causal, (e.g., both the duck and the rabbit performing the same hand-flexing gesture, or both
covering their eyes). Such displays were accompanied with a nonce word in either a transitive
frame (“the bunny is gorping the duck) or an intransitive frame (“the bunny and duck are
gorping”). Using the preferential-looking paradigm, Naigles (1990) observed that the toddlers
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preferred looking at the causal scene for gorp in a transitive frame, and the non-causal scene for
the intransitive frame.
Subsequent studies have largely confirmed that the process of learning verbs with
multiple thematic roles is in place by around 24 months of age. The data from younger infants is
somewhat contradictory. Gertner & Fisher (2012) found that infants treated the mere presence of
two nouns in an utterance as indicative of a transitive event, even when the utterance was
produced in an intransitive manner (e.g., “the boy and the girl are gorping”). In contrast,
Arunachalam, Escovar, Hansen, & Waxman (2013) found that, 21-mo-olds who had merely been
exposed to two interlocutors speaking using a novel verb in a transitive frame (“The lady fezzed
my brother”) preferred to look at a video of one person pushing another compared to a video of
those two people performing the same action. However, no such preference was obtained when
infants first heard a novel verb in an intransitive, two-participant frame (“The lady and my
brother fezzed”). Additionally, infants are even sensitive to the order of participants (i.e., in
English, their assignment to thematic roles) in a two-predicate sentence. Gertner, Fisher, &
Eisengart (2006) found that both 24-mo-olds and 21-mo-olds, exposed to sentences like “the
duck is gorping the bunny,” looked longer at a video of an action where the duck was the agent,
while they looked longer at a video of an action where the bunny was an agent when exposed to
“the bunny is gorping the duck.”
These observations support the conclusion that learning two-place predicate verbs is
getting off the ground towards the end of the second year (see also, e.g., Scott & Fisher, 2009;
Waxman, Lidz, Braun, & Levy, 2009; Yuan, Fisher, & Snedeker, 2012). That these competences
might not be quite adult-like is suggested by, e.g., Arunachalam & Waxman (2015), who found
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that even at 27 months of age, toddlers appeared to require rich semantic support to understand
dynamic transitive events. They were able to infer the meaning of a novel transitive verb only
when it was used with full NPs (“The boy is pilking the balloon.”) but not with pronouns (“He is
pilking it.”). Further, in their more difficult, act-out task, 3-year-olds could not correctly place
agents and patients (e.g., in “Make Big Bird dack Cookie Monster”) when they had previously
been exposed to only the verb in an uninformative frame (“This is called dacking”). Finally,
Arunachalam & Dennis (2019) showed that when 2-yr-olds hear transitive structures (like “The
girl is lorping the lady!”) in the absence of any referent, their interpretation is restricted to
causative events (e.g., the girl pushing the lady) but not contact events (e.g., the girl patting the
lady).
We can therefore safely conclude that 12-24-mo-olds perceive and understand two-place,
causal events, and are still in the process of developing adult-like assignment of such events to
transitive structures in their language. But to reiterate, we are studying implicit concept
formation without linguistic clues. There are no linguistic prompts in the experiment, and the
children are at an age when they are not yet producing reversible transitive sentences themselves.
We are interested in seeing if our participants can encode the events as members of the same
abstract class, abstracting over different agents and patients. We are not interested in our
participants merely identifying a particular scene as being causal (a car pushing a dog). Nor are
we merely interested in whether participants can correctly identify the thematic roles of the
pusher and the pushee across a series of reversible causative events of cars pushing dogs and
dogs pushing cars. We ask instead, can they appreciate that Scooby Doo pushing the Ford is the
same as Lassie pushing the Audi, or Pluto pushing an Aston Martin? In other words, can they
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build representations of dynamic scenes depicting a causal relation between two entities (e.g., a
dog pushing a car) that is abstract enough to support the identification of other scenes with
different tokens of the entities performing the same action (a visually distinct dog pushing a
visually distinct car in a different direction), and yet maintaining the same thematic relation (e.g.,
rejecting a scene portraying a car pushing a dog)? To build this representation means to encode
each scene with just the right degree of abstraction that it can be recognized across trials in
memory: not so particular that each event looks different, and not so abstract that the agent and
object kinds can be switched.
We compare the identification and generalization of such reversible two-place
predicates/relations/event sortals with the identification and generalization of simpler, one-place
predicates such as a dog rolling (vs a car rolling). Although the two kinds of events are quite
distinct, we have tried to make the visual stimuli as similar as possible. Nevertheless, given the
substantial distinction between the one- and two-place predicates, we treat these as different
experiments, and our analyses therefore do not also include a single factor separating one- and
two-place predicate conditions. We first describe results with two-place predicates in Experiment
1, and turn to the simpler, one-place predicates in Experiment 2.

Experiment 1: Generalizing a two-place predicate in infants and adults
The dog pushes the car/ The car pushes the dog
We chose to use the general predicate “a dog pushes a car” (and vice-versa) so that
category membership of the two classes would be very clear. We make no commitment about the
specific categories used to encode these events. For example, these could be encoded not

17

necessarily as dogs and cars, but could be encoded as animal and vehicle, living and non-living,
or as natural and artificial (see Mandler, 2008). The specific encodings don’t matter, as long as
participants see the two as distinct classes, and can build structured representations over these
relatively more abstract classes (e.g., “a living thing pushes an artificial thing.”) Indeed, given
the perceptual similarities between the members of the dog set and the car set (e.g., the
presence/absence of legs, wheels, eyes, or differences in shape and size), even perceptual
categories over such feature sets would work. That is, while we remain committed to the idea
that representing such events requires abstract symbols, we remain neutral regarding the specific
symbols chosen. Nothing rests on the details of object representations beyond the findings that
infants in their second year of life are capable of distinguishing our two actors as distinct kinds.
Our question is, can they build structured memory representations of dynamic events involving
the two kinds of actors in a way that maintains their asymmetric agency at this linguistic stage?
In de Villiers (2014) and subsequent studies, the authors used naturalistic stimuli – video
recordings of the various dynamic actions. These introduce a host of irrelevant variables that
separate the role-reversed videos, including the precise angles of the participants, durations of
various segments of the actions, the precise manner of implementation of an action, in addition
to perceptual variables like lighting and background color palettes. In order to simplify the task
for infants, we decided to construct videos using animation and video editing software. The goal
was to reduce the number of irrelevant differences between the videos – both within and across
the “event sortals” – to give infants a leg up in learning the contingencies that predicted a reward
in the task (see next section).
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An important difference from the previous studies was that, instead of beginning each trial
with a still image that later animates, we started with showing one complete cycle of the dynamic
event in both the left and right on-screen windows, such that during the anticipatory period the
participants in both (paused) videos were in neutral positions that gave no indication of their
roles during the initial or subsequent dynamic video portions of each trial. Therefore, unlike in
the previous experiments described above, participants could not identify the correct side based
on information presented during the anticipatory period alone.
Infants and one group of adults passively watched the sequence of videos; a second group
of adult participants additionally shadowed an audiobook presented over headphones.
Materials and methods
Reversible, two-place event videos and construction of individual trials
To construct the videos, we started with a set of 16 images of dog and car exemplars that were
manipulated to have a variety of hues and saturations, and were cropped and scaled to fit an
imaginary box, 270w × 240h pixels. All dogs were scaled to fit precisely within this box. All
cars fit the width precisely, but varied in their heights, from between 80 to 128 pixels. We then
created a set of animations, each of which had pairs of videos (see Fig. 1). Each pair consisted of
a dog-pushing-car event loop and a car-pushing-dog event loop. Note that “pushing” in all videos
consisted of the dog or car image moving along the screen towards its counterpart; when the
bounding box for the pusher contacted the bounding box for the pushee, the latter began moving
backward, as if pushed by the former. Then, both images returned to the original position. The
original position, that is, the first and last frames of each video, were identical to allow
continuous looping, and consisted of the dog and the car facing each other. Each loop began with
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both the dog and the car performing a little “hop” over the first 9 frames (~375ms) – this was
done to ensure that a low-level perceptual cue corresponding to the first moving object was not
sufficient to make the correct generalization. We counterbalanced the side of the two events, and,
within the events, the direction in which the pusher pushed – towards the screen center or away
from it. Each video had a grayscale version and a color version. Except for the first eight trials
(see Methods below), all trials had different combinations of the 16 dogs and 16 cars.
An example of one trial is shown in Figure 1 below (please see
https://youtu.be/Qwo3OsTyIiA for a video demo). Briefly, each trial began with the left video
animating to show two grayscale loops, followed by the right video animating to show two
grayscale loops. The offset of the right video loops was followed by a ‘+’ flashed briefly
between the two video frames, which marked the onset of the anticipatory period. Following the
2.5sec anticipatory period, the target video (e.g., the car-push-dog event) animated with the
figures in color, and was accompanied by a happy jingle.
----------------Figure 1 here
-----------------Trial sequences
We prepared two lists of trials. In one, the target (i.e., the event that turned colorful and
animated, accompanied with a jingle) was the dog-push-car event, while in the other the target
was the car-push-dog event. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the two lists.
Participants were shown a total of up to 32 trials. The number of trials was chosen to be
similar to the ones used in the previous studies (e.g., Nordmeyer & de Villiers, 2019). Given that
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this is a first study of its kind, the exact number of trials was an open, empirical question. The
first eight trials had the same dog and car tokens, with the side of the critical event and the
direction of pushing (towards the center of the screen or towards the screen periphery)
counterbalanced across the 8 trials. The next set of 24 trials had a new set of dogs and cars, and
over the course of the 24 trials we varied the appearances of specific dog and car tokens. This
design detail was inspired, in part, by animal behavior studies, in which a series of “shaping
trials” serve to successively approach the desired behavior. Trials sequences were programmed in
Psyscope X (psy.ck.sissa.it).
Experimental set up
The infant studies reported here were completed at the first author’s institute. The adult
studies were completed across both authors’ institutes. Participants in the first location were
tested using a Tobii TX300 eyetracker, which has a screen resolution of 1920×1080 pixels and
samples eye data at 300Hz, and participants in the second location were tested using a Tobii T60
eyetracker with a screen resolution of 1280×1024 pixels and a sampling rate of 60Hz. The videos
were designed such that the animations were identically sized on both screens, both in terms of
the number of pixels and in terms of their visual extent relative to the viewer, by extending the
background of the animations as appropriate to the two different screens. The analyses (see
below) were designed to be insensitive to differences in the sampling rates.
Participants
Adults participants across all these studies were recruited primarily from the university
undergraduate and graduate populations, and were compensated with either $5.00 or extra class
credits. Further, across all adult and infant studies, an equal number of participants was assigned

21

to the sub-conditions – for example, the Car-push-Dog vs the Dog-push-Car sub-conditions in
this experiment.
Here, we had 20 adults (13 females, mean age 22.4y ±4y) in the Verbal Shadowing
condition and 20 adults (16 females, mean age 23.2y ±6.7y) in the No-shadow condition. In both
conditions, the target for half the adults was Car-push-Dog, while for the other half it was
Dog-push-Car. Of these, one participant in the No-shadow condition was excluded for poor data
quality (see exclusion criteria described in the Data analysis section below).
Infant participants were recruited through a variety of methods including mailings, and
online and print advertisements. We tested a total of 25 infants between 12m;9d and 24m;6d in
this study (mean age 18m;12d ±125d, 14 females), of which 5 were excluded for poor data
quality, and two for eye-tracker failure that resulted in no data. Caregivers were paid $20, free
parking, and offered a small gift (lab magnet, sippy cup) for their participation. Each study was
approved by the relevant University IRB board.
Procedure
Adults in the Verbal Suppression condition shadowed George Orwell’s Nineteen
Eighty-Four, presented over headphones at a comfortable listening level, and were given a short
training session to practice shadowing, before starting the main experiment. An experimenter sat
out of view of the adult participant and ensured that no participant paused for more than 2
seconds. All adult participants were instructed to simply watch the sequence of pre-constructed
video trials.
Infants sat on their caregiver’s lap. Caregivers wore a soft felt visor pulled low over their
forehead, allowing them to monitor their baby while obscuring their view of the eyetracker
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screen or cameras. Adults sat in a chair in front of the eyetracker. The eyetracker was calibrated
using Tobii Studio. Subsequently, participants were shown the sequence of trial videos. Each trial
video began with a small looming image of a cross accompanied by a monotonous drum. This
loop continued until the participant looked at the screen, at which point the video for that trial
started.
Data analysis
In order to compare results across adults and infants, and across the two eye tracking
systems, we performed the following: (1) The entire data was centered by replacing the median
x,y of the gaze data with the x,y of the screen center. This allows correcting for deviances due to
improper calibrations and variations in gaze direction – particularly an issue with infants. (2)
Since the two animation ‘windows’ in each trial were centered on the screen, we removed all
gaze points outside the 95th percentile along the x and y dimensions. (3) Gaze data was divided
into a series of epochs corresponding to the individual trials. (4) Given that the centered,
percentiled data was constrained to the two on-screen animation ‘windows’, we ignored the
y-axis and looked exclusively at the (left-right) x-axis. Finally, given that the first eight trials had
identical dogs and cars, and the remaining had different combinations of dogs and cars (and
directions of “pushing”), we restricted our analyses to trials 9-32.
We examined individual trials and participants for quality. First, a small fraction of trials
had variant durations, most likely due to high priority housekeeping functions in the OS of the
machine running Psyscope X. Therefore, any trials where the number of data frames was beyond
± 30% of the expected number of frames (i.e., ±90 frames for a 300Hz eyetracker, or ±12 frames
for a 60Hz eyetracker) were rejected.
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Next, trials in which the anticipatory period (the focus of the analysis) contained less than
70% of valid data were rejected. In this context, a valid data point was defined as any frame with
valid gaze point coordinates, without considering whether the gaze point was from a single eye
or from both eyes, and ignoring the validity score for that gaze point. A rejected data point was
either a data point that the eyetracker could not provide a value for, or a point that was outside
the 95th percentile along the x-dimension.
Finally, we removed participants who did not have at least two un-rejected trials when the
target was on the left and two un-rejected trials when the target was on the right. Therefore, each
participant contributed at least 4 trials (2 each for target on left/right), and each of these had at
least 70% of valid gaze data. To reiterate, this minimum trial requirement is only considering
trials 9 to 32; the first 8 trials comprise the “training” or “shaping” trials as described above.
We examined gaze data in the x-direction (the dependent variable) separately for those
trials where the target animation was on the left and those where it was on the right (e.g., see
Figure 2 below). It is important to note that in our design, each of the two side-by-side stills is
successively animated: the left always animates before the right, and both happen before the
anticipatory period for all trials. This is needed to demonstrate the order of causal action in each
still. As a consequence, we expect a right-ward bias in all of our data, the magnitude of which
will depend on individual and group differences in returning to the central fixation. We therefore
do not compare deviations from screen center in our analyses, but only measure and report
comparisons between mean gaze positions during the anticipatory period for the set of trials
where the upcoming target is on the right versus the set of trials when the upcoming target in on
the left.
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First, we used a bootstrapping method to see if, across the entire trial time, the x-locations
differed significantly at specific time-points from the beginning to the end of the trial. In
particular, we employed a permutation method similar to that described in Maris & Oostenveld
(2007), and Ferry et. al. (2015). For this analysis, each participant contributed two time-series:
the mean x-gaze averaged across the trials 9-32 (see above) for the target-on-right trials, and the
mean x-gaze averaged across the trials 9-32 for the target-on-left trials. First, frame-wise
one-tailed, independent sample t-tests was computed, asking if x-locations in target-on-right
trials was significantly larger (i.e., more to the right) than x-locations on target-on-left trials, for
all the frames in a trial across all participants in that group. Then, all time-points where the
difference was significant at p=0.05 were marked. Next, runs, i.e., continuous frames of
significant points, that were at least 100ms in duration were evaluated for their significance by
(1) computing the expected t-value for a significance of α=0.05 given the number of comparisons
in a particular run (2) randomly shuffling the labels (target-on-left or target-on-right) of each
time-series 1,000 times and computing a distribution of t-values for each run, and (3) marking as
significant all the time points in a particular run where the expected t-value was in the 5% tails of
their shuffled distributions. Note that, since only the labels are shuffled, we preserve any
run-wise, within-trial temporal correlations. Surviving runs of significant differences are
indicated on the figures for each condition (e.g., see Figures 2 and 3 from Experiment 1).
Next, we examined whether the average eye-gaze horizontal (x-)positions in the
anticipatory period were significantly different for the trials where the target animation was on
the left or was on the right. An examination of the shuffle analysis described above indicated
that, while significant differences were found between target-on-right and target-on-left trials
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across the entire anticipatory period for adults, the effect appeared to be localized to the early
part of the anticipatory period for the infants (see Figure 9). We therefore used only the first half
of the anticipatory window for infants for the analyses described here, but the entire anticipatory
period for adults.
Each participant contributed two sets of values – the mean gaze x-location in the
anticipatory periods for each target-on-left trial, and the corresponding mean gaze x-location in
the anticipatory periods for each target-on-right trials, for a maximum of 48 (2x24) data points
per participant. We fit this data to the simplest theoretically meaningful linear ‘base’ model using
the R package lme4 (Bates et al, 2015). For infants, the simplest model examined the dependent
variable mean gaze x-position (MeanGazeX) as a function of whether the post-anticipatory target
was to the right or to the left of center (IsTargetRight), and included random participant (Id)
slopes:
model <- lmer(MeanGazeX ~ IsTargetRight + (1|Id))
For adults, the corresponding model included whether or not participants underwent
simultaneous verbal suppression (IsVerbalShadow):
model <- lmer(MeanGazeX ~ IsTargetRight * IsVerbalShadow + (1|Id))
We subsequently added in a variable corresponding to the specific sub-condition the participant
was exposed to, i.e., whether the target for that participant was dog-push-car or car-push-dog. We
only included this variable if its inclusion significantly improved the simplest model. For infants,
inclusion of the sub-category variable did not significantly improve the base model, while for
adults it did (Χ2(4) =24.14, p<0.0001). We therefore upgraded the model for adults to include
this additional term:
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model <- lmer(MeanGazeX ~ IsTargetRight * IsVerbalShadow * Subcondition + (1|Id))
Finally, for all models, we report Tukey-adjusted p-values for contrasts, computed using the R
package lsmeans (Lenth, 2016).

Results
Adults
Figure 2 shows the eye-tracking results from the adult participants without verbal
shadowing in this two-place predicate generalization study, while Figure 3 shows this data for
adult participants with verbal shadowing. The x-axis of the figures is trial time (in seconds),
while the y-axis represents gaze location along the horizontal axis of the eye-tracker screen, with
0 representing screen center.
----------------Figure 2 here
------------------

----------------Figure 3 here
------------------

The figures show that, prior to the anticipatory period, participants in both groups follow the side
that animates, first looking to the left of center and then to the right (recall that this is the fixed
order of presentation of the initial videos for all trials). In the post-anticipation period too,
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participants look at the side with the animation – to the right (light thin lines) in target-on-right
trials and to the left (dark thick lines) in target-on-left trials. This is to be expected. However,
critically, there is an anticipatory effect for non-shadowing participants, who look significantly
more to the right in target-on-right trials compared to target-on-left trials in the anticipatory
period, seen here in the series of dots marking bootstrapped significant stretches in the
anticipatory period.
Summarizing the results of the linear model, participants who underwent verbal
shadowing did not show any anticipatory effects, while the participants in the no-shadowing
condition showed significant anticipatory effects. These were driven primarily by the
dog-push-car sortal.
----------------Figure 4 here
-----------------In the linear mixed model (see Figure 4), we found only a significant effect of the
particular sub-condition (i.e., whether the target sortal was dog-push-car or car-push-dog), t(85)
=-5.2, p<0.001). Additionally, the intercept was significant, t(86)=2.27, p=0.026. The
sub-condition factor showed an interaction with both the upcoming target location, t(836)=4.68,
p<0.001, and with verbal shadowing, t(82)=2.8, p=0.006, and the three-way interaction was
significant, t(836)=-2.68, p=0.008. Finally, all contrasts comparing target on left/right for the
combination of with/out verbal shadowing and sub-condition, i.e., where the target was
dog-push-car/car-push-dog, with/without shadowing, were non-significant at p>0.85, with the
exception of dog-push-car without shadowing, where the mean gaze position when the upcoming
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target was on the right was significantly more right-ward than when the upcoming target was on
the left, p<0.001.
Infants
Figure 5 shows the eye-tracking results from the 12-24 month-olds with the two-place
event sortals. As with the adult data, the x-axis of the figure is trial time (in seconds), while the
y-axis represents gaze x-location. Although the infants follow the side of animation, they fail to
show significant anticipatory responses; while the bootstrap method identifies nearly the entire
post-anticipation time period as showing significant differences between target-on-right and
target-on-left trials, these do not extend to the anticipatory period.
----------------Figure 5 here
-----------------In the linear model, we only found a significant intercept, t(39)=4.95, p<0.001, which is
readily explained by the design of the experiment: because the order of presentation of the two
event sortals was always left, followed by right, followed by the anticipatory period with the still
images, we would expect the observed rightward bias of the mean eye-gaze position, particularly
in the early part of the anticipatory period.

Discussion
In this experiment, participants had to learn to anticipate the side with a colorful,
multimodal animation based on a specific, reversible two-place event sortal, like a dog pushing a
car; distinguishing it from its reversed counterpart, a car pushing a dog. The results presented
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above suggest that neither adults who have their language faculty tied up in a shadowing task,
nor 12-24-mo-old infants can successfully recognize such a specific, reversible event sortal
across changes in participant identities and other details such as the left/right on-screen location
of the event. In contrast, adult participants in the no-shadowing condition were able to anticipate
correctly, although this effect was primarily driven by participants in the dog-push-car condition.
Before drawing conclusions about the observed pattern of failures and successes, we present our
findings from the one-place predicate version of this experiment. Under the hypothesis that a
dynamic event sortal corresponding to a one-place predicate might be cognitively easier, we
expect greater success in the one-place version. Vonk (2002) asked whether great apes could
form concepts of relationships, most pertinently, particular activities like grooming or playing,
where the actors changed. The task used was match to sample, with real photographs. Each of
the apes (a juvenile gorilla and two mature orangutans) responded well above chance in
distinguishing the actions despite changes in actors, even when the species of actor varied. But
notice this is less than we demand of the participants who have to notice agent type as well (car
versus dog). To our knowledge no work has explored the kind of event sortal describe here in
other species, even at the 1PP level.
Importantly for us, Experiment 1 used a novel method, intended to test a hypothesis not
previously tested in infants, and from the data, it is not clear whether there is a failure of the
method, or whether infants are cognitively incapable of forming the kinds of event sortals we
test. The observation that infants generally seem to accurately track the side that animates during
the entirety of the trial (see Figure 5) indicates that infants appear to be engaged in the
audiovisual features of the experiment, and show a significantly distinct pattern of following the

30

target animation following the anticipatory period (revealed by the permutation analysis
indicated at the bottom of the gaze data in Figure 5).
We again test 12-24-mo-olds and adults with and without verbal shadowing in the
one-place version.

Experiment 2: Representing a one-place predicate in infants and adults
One-place event videos and construction of individual trials
In order to keep this experiment as similar as possible to the previous, we decided to keep the
two participants on-screen as in the previous experiments. That is, each event always had a dog
and a car facing each other as in the previous experiments, but only one of the two types was
involved in the dynamic event. Indeed, the “neutral positions” at the first and last frames of each
video, and at the frames during the anticipatory period were identical to the previous
experiments.
This experiment had two different event sortals; we presented participants with pairs of
animations corresponding to one-place predicates such as “dog rolling” or “car rolling” where
the target event sortal for a given participant was always either the rolling dog or the rolling car.
Note that by “rolling” we simply mean that we rotated through 360° and vertically translated the
image of the dog or the car, while its partner remained stationary (but see the next paragraph).
That is, participants were required to build classes of dynamic events corresponding to the same
specific action of the same moving entity (car or dog). For example, for a participant in the
dog-roll condition, neither the presence of the dog alone, nor the presence of a rolling action
alone would be sufficient to identify the target correctly, since both of the side-by-side videos
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have a dog and a car, and both show the rolling motion. The expected event sortal is a
combination of the dog and the rolling motion. Successfully identifying such an event sortal and
generalizing it to other instances of cars/dogs can then be indexed by significant anticipations to
the correct, target side on each trial.
Although only one of the entities rolled or jumped across all trials, we retained the initial
little “hop” by both the car and the dog (see previous Methods section) to ensure, again, that a
low-level, first-moving-object cue was not sufficient to make the correct generalization (although
this is less of an issue in the current design), and to keep the videos as similar to the previous
study as possible. Subsequently, only the relevant entity rolled in the time it took for the car or
dog to push the other object in the previous experiment. Thus, the timing and time-line of events
within each trial for these videos was also identical to those from the previous experiment.
As with the previous experiment, one group of adult participants passively watched the
videos, while the other group was simultaneously engaged in verbal shadowing of text.
Participants
For this study we had 17 adults in the no-shadowing condition of which 3 were excluded
for poor data quality, and 19 adults in the shadowing condition of which 1 was excluded for poor
data quality. We recruited 20 infants for this study (mean age 17m;18d, 12females). Of these, 3
were excluded for poor data quality. For both adults and infants, exclusion criteria and other
details of recruitment were identical to the previous study.
Materials and methods
Besides the specific videos used, all other aspects of this study were identical to the
previous.
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Data analysis
Data analysis used the previously described analytic pipeline.

Results
Adults
Figure 6 shows the eye-tracking results from the adult participants without verbal
shadowing in this one-place predicate generalization study, while Figure 7 shows these data for
adult participants with verbal shadowing. As in all similar previous figures, the x-axis of the
figures is trial time (in seconds), while the y-axis represents gaze location along the horizontal
axis of the eye-tracker screen, with 0 representing screen center.
----------------Figure 6 here
------------------

----------------Figure 7 here
------------------

The figures again show that adult participants in both of these groups show a similar pre- and
post-anticipatory period pattern of following the side that animates (compare with Figures 2 &
3).
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Crucially, in these one-place predicate groups, there is evidence for significant
anticipations towards the correct side, in both the shadowing and non-shadowing groups. This
can be seen in the separation between the mean eye-gaze traces for the target-on-right (light,
dotted) and the target-on-left (dark, solid) lines in the anticipatory period (box), and the
significant stretches marked in the corresponding shuffle analysis results at the bottom of the
graph.
Summarizing the results of the linear model for participants in this one-place predicate
experiment, participants showed a significant anticipatory effect with or without shadowing, and
there was further an effect of the event sortal itself, with the dog-roll event sortal showing a
stronger anticipatory effect than the car-roll sortal.
----------------Figure 8 here
-----------------In the linear mixed model for the one-place predicate group, (Figure 8), we found a
significant effect of the upcoming target location on eye gaze in the anticipatory period, such that
the mean gaze position was significantly more right-ward when the upcoming target was on the
right, t(763)=3.43, p<0.001. There was also a significant effect of verbal shadowing, t(77)=-2.1,
p=0.04, and a significant effect of the particular sub-condition (i.e., whether the target event
sortal was dog-roll or car-roll), t(76)=-3.59, p<0.001). The sub-condition factor showed an
interaction with both the upcoming target location, t(759)=4.8, p<0.001, and with verbal
shadowing, t(74)=3.24, p=0.002, and the three-way interaction was significant, t(758)=-3.47,
p<0.001. Finally, all contrasts comparing target on left/right for the combination of with/out
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verbal shadowing and sub-condition (i.e., where the target was dog-roll/car-roll, with/without
shadowing), were significant at p<0.001, with the exception of car-roll in the non-shadowing
condition, which was significant at p=0.015.
Infants
Figure 9 shows the eye-tracking results from the infant participants. The figure indicates that
infants can indeed come to correctly anticipate the target side, when the targets are classes of
events that can be described by one-place predicates. The permutation analysis depicted in the
figure identifies significant stretches in the first half of the anticipatory period, where the gaze
x-position trace in target-on-right trials differs from the target-on-left trials.
----------------Figure 9 here
-----------------The linear model found a significant effect of whether the upcoming target was on the
right or left, with the mean gaze position more to the right on the former compared to the latter,
t(255)=25.14, p=0.004. Figure 10 shows the mean gaze x-position during the anticipatory period
for both this infant study, with one-place predicates, and the infant study described above, with
two-place predicates. Note that, in contrast to the Figures for adult studies (Figures 4,8, and 14
below), Figure 10 does not show a breakdown by sub-conditions (Car-push-Dog/Dog-push-Car
or Car-roll/Dog-roll), because we did not find an effect of sub-conditions in our statistical
models, as we did with all the adult studies (see the Data Analysis section for Experiment 1
aboe).
-----------------
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Figure 10 here
------------------

Age-related effects in infants
Given that the age range of our infants is fairly large (12mo – 24mo), we examined the
data from both one- and two-place predicate experiments for any age-related trends. To do this,
we collapsed the anticipatory looking behavior of each infant into a single measure: the
difference between mean gaze x-position in target-on-right trials and the mean gaze x-position in
target-on-left trials. Since successful anticipation is conveyed by more positive (i.e., more
right-ward) values of the mean gaze x-position, we would expect positive values of this
‘anticipation effect’ metric as indicating successful anticipations.
----------------Figure 11 here
-----------------Figure 11 shows the relation between age in months and the anticipatory effect metric. This
metric re-captures the observation that infants perform better with a one-place predicate type
(event sortals) compared to two-place predicate type – the trend line for the former is higher
– i.e., more positive – than that for the latter. However, these trend lines are not significant for
either the one-place predicate type, Pearson’s r = 0.31, p=0.19, or the two-place predicate type,
Pearson’s r = 0.24, p=0.29. We thus fail to find any significant developmental change in this age
range.
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Discussion
In this experiment we designed materials that were visually similar to those from the
previous experiment, with the exception that, while the former consisted of videos depicting
dynamic events that could be described by two-place predicates, the ones in this experiment
depicted dynamic events that could be described by one-place predicates. We find that adults can
successfully anticipate both the rolling dog and the rolling car, whether simultaneously
shadowing text or not. However, we also find a significant 3-way interaction (see Figure 8),
driven by a particularly large anticipatory effect – i.e., a larger positive (rightward) mean gaze
position in target-on-right trials and a larger and more negative (leftward) mean gaze position in
target-on-left trials – for the dog-roll, no-shadowing condition, compared to all the other
conditions. Curiously, in the two-place predicate experiment, the largest (and indeed the only
significant) anticipatory effect was observed for the dog-push-car, no-shadowing group. This
observation suggests the hypothesis that predicates corresponding to event sortals with an
animate subject/agent might be privileged in their computation and/or generalization.
Turning to infants, in this condition we do find evidence that 12-24-mo-olds could
successfully anticipate the correct upcoming target location, indicating that they can both build
classes of events and generalize these over new tokens, and that they can encode and correctly
anticipate the target side during the anticipatory period. These results suggest that infants’ lack of
correct anticipations in the previous experiment cannot easily be attributed to the novel design,
nor to infants’ cognitive abilities required for categorizing and generalizing dynamic event
sortals, nor to making anticipatory eye movements based on their categorization abilities.
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However, the nature of the target event sortal, whether with animate subject/agent or not, did not
appear to have any effect on the infants’ performance. Finally, while we did not find any
age-related effects of infants’ anticipatory prowess in this or the previous experiment, it should
be acknowledged that such age-related effects might indeed exist but not be revealed by our
post-hoc analyses.
Taken together, these studies reveal the possibility of an effect of language on the
formation of complex concepts (event sortals) that correspond to reversible, two-place
predicates: adults undergoing simultaneous verbal shadowing, and 12-24-mo-old infants, are
incapable of forming and generalizing such two-place event sortals. In contrast, verbal
shadowing does not prevent the formation of comparatively simpler concepts that correspond to
one-place predicates, and infants too succeed in this case.
The role of verbal shadowing in these studies is not entirely clear. In part, this is because
any primary task is bound to be negatively affected by a concurrent secondary, irrelevant task,
just because our cognitive resources are not limitless. Our secondary task, verbal shadowing,
involves cognitive elements such as articulation and attention, which can only contribute
generally, alongside elements that contribute specifically to disrupt structural processing aspects
of language. This secondary task has an independent effect even in the simpler, one-place
predicate adult conditions (see Experiment 2, Adult results). Since it is the structural,
grammatical elements of language that we believe might underlie the building of corresponding
conceptual structures, we ran a second version of our adult verbal shadowing experiments, but
we minimized structural processing by having participants repeat a sequence of letters and
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numbers, rather than shadow Nineteen Eighty-Four. We report adults’ performance in both the
one-place and the two-place versions of the task with what we call non-grammatical shadowing.

Experiment 3: Representing one- and two-place predicates in adults with non-grammatical
shadowing
This experiment is a replication of the verbal shadowing versions of the one- and
two-place predicate adult experiments described above, with the exception of the nature of the
shadowing task. Our hypothesis is that, since this type of shadowing involves only a minimal
engagement of the participants’ grammatical system, we expect the participants to be able to
build and generalize both one- and two-place event sortals despite concurrent shadowing.
Participants
We recruited 19 participants for the one-place predicate group, of which none were
excluded. We recruited an additional 18 participants for the two-place predicate group of which 2
were excluded for poor data quality. Exclusion criteria and other details of recruitment were
identical to the previous experiments.
Materials and methods
All aspects of this study were the same as those for the one- and two-place predicate,
adult verbal shadowing conditions reported in Experiments 1 and 2, with the exception of the
shadowing itself. Instead of shadowing a novel, adults repeated the sequence
A…B…C…1…2…3 continuously. As with the previous shadowing experiments, all participants
practiced this non-grammatical shadowing just before beginning the study, and an experimenter
ensured that none of the participants paused for more than 2 seconds.
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Data analysis
Data analysis used the previous analytic pipeline. The linear models used were exactly
the same as those for the previous verbal shadowing conditions as described above. For the
one-place predicate condition, this was also the simplest and the best model, and an improvement
over the baseline model, Χ2(2)=13.83, p<0.001, while for the two-place predicate, this was not
statistically different from the base model, Χ2(2)=0.6, p=0.74.

Results
Figure 12 shows the eye-tracking results from adult participants with concurrent
non-grammatical shadowing in the one-place predicate generalization condition, while Figure 13
shows this data for adult participants in the two-place version. As in all similar previous figures,
the x-axis of the figures is trial time (in seconds), while the y-axis represents gaze location along
the horizontal axis of the eye-tracker screen, with 0 representing screen center, and dots at the
bottom represent regions of significance in the shuffle analysis.
----------------Figure 12 here
---------------------------------Figure 13 here
-----------------Figures 12 & 13 show that non-grammatical shadowing does not appear to suppress
concept formation and generalization for either one- or two-place predicates. The linear model
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for the one-place predicate (see Figure 14A) showed a significant effect of whether the upcoming
target was to the left or to the right, t(397)=3.07, p=0.002, of the sub-condition dog roll/car roll,
t(46)=-2.32, p=0.025, a significant interaction between the two, t(396)=3.76, p<0.001, and a
significant intercept, t(49)=-2.57, p=0.014. The contrasts showed that the mean gaze x-position
during the anticipatory window was more to the right for target-on-right trials compared to
target-on-left trials both for the dog-roll group, t(395)=-9.0, p<0.001, and for the car-roll group,
t(397)=-3.06, p=0.012.
----------------Figure 14 here
-----------------A similar analysis for the two-place predicate version (Figure 14B) found only a
significant effect of whether the upcoming target was to the left or to the right, t(371)=2.24,
p=0.026. The contrasts showed that this was primarily due to the mean gaze x-position during
the anticipatory window being more to the right for target-on-right trials compared to
target-on-left trials for the dog-push-car group, t(372)=-3.12, p=0.011; these values for the
car-push-dog group did not reach significance, t(371)=-2.24, p=0.12.
To summarize, we find that non-grammatical shadowing allows for detecting and
generalizing the reinforced event sortal, whether it corresponds to the simpler, one-place
predicate, or to the more complex, two-place predicate. As in the previous adult experiments
reported above, we again find an advantage for the predicates/sortals with the animate (dog)
subject/agent. Note that the nature of the interference caused by verbal shadowing is much
disputed, and there is still much work to be done. Newton & de Villiers (2007) asked whether
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adults could reason about another’s false beliefs (FB) (as opposed to true beliefs) while
shadowing a story, compared to an attentionally-matched condition of rhythmic shadowing.
Their answer was no, but others have countered with results that suggest rhythmic shadowing
can also disrupt FB reasoning (Dungan & Saxe, 2012) and Forgeot-d’Arc and Ramos (2011)
found evidence that verbal shadowing disrupted physical reasoning as well as FB. All of these
used shadowing of continuous verbal material, as in an audiobook. However, Samuel, Durdevic,
Legg, Lurz & Clayton (2019) found verbal “shadowing” of digits did not interfere with false
belief reasoning. In that study, the subjects were discouraged from speaking aloud, and judged on
their memory for the digits. Thus, there are two problems: is verbal shadowing itself a continuum
in terms of the involvement of the language faculty? All shadowing tasks entail decrements in
attention, but within language shadowing, is some material more involving of the deeper
language faculty, perhaps the grammar, than others? The present study bears out that idea, as the
simple non-grammatical shadowing was disruptive, but not destructive, of the adult’s ability to
form a complex event sortal, but the grammatical shadowing wiped it out. Second there is the
question of the extent to which the conceptual task entails language. The FB tasks in the studies
above were all different in the degree of perceptual complexity and their response demands,
leading to the possibility that not all were equal under interference. The current study supports
that too, in that forming a class of the transitive events was not disrupted even by grammatical
interference, but the class of intransitive events was not.

General Discussion and Conclusions
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In this paper, we aim to extend a prior research program with adults that investigates
possible candidate concepts that might be cognitively comparatively simpler and comparatively
more complex– simplicity being operationally defined as the resistance to verbal suppression in
an online anticipatory categorization task with adult participants. Using a modified version of
those tasks that allows us to compare the performance of 12-24-mo-old infants and adults in very
similar paradigms, we explore the formation of event sortals that differ in their linguistic
descriptions, two-place or one-place predicates. Our results suggest that infants fail to represent
event sortals corresponding to a two-place predicate (“dog pushes car”) but succeed in a
one-place predicate (“dog jumps”). The adult data replicates previous findings, in that two-place
event sortals are more vulnerable to verbal shadowing compared to one-place event sortals.
From a technical and design viewpoint, this study presents a unique opportunity to
understand both the similarities and differences of the infant and the adult mind, and the role of
language in extracting event descriptions that tie together sets of dynamic events despite
variations in surface features – what we refer to as event sortals. Several features of the study and
the results give us confidence in the pattern of results obtained, and which lead us to our
interpretations. First, we have taken great care to ensure that low-level features cannot easily
explain the pattern of results. All videos were created using software that allowed us to depict
events that were spatially and temporally very well controlled. Thus, event sortals corresponding
to dogs pushing cars and those corresponding to cars pushing dogs cannot be readily
distinguished based on low-level features. We included a small, simultaneous “hop” by both the
pusher and the pushee in each animation to further ensure that the first moving object did not
contain information that could be used to distinguish the target side. Between the two-place and
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one-place experiments, we kept the timing and gross spatial layout the same, such that the
neutral positions of all videos (a dog facing a car) were identical across the two experiments.
Second, we find ample evidence that both adults and infants are engaged in our
experiments, and that they spontaneously learn to predict the side of the upcoming target event
sortal. Evidence for engagement comes from examining the pattern of looking behavior during
the pre- and post-anticipatory phases: during these phases, both infants and adults track the side
that animates, as seen in the eye-gaze traces (Figures 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 9, 12, 13). This is particularly
clear in the post-anticipatory period, where all groups show significant differences between the
target-on-left traces and the target-on-right traces throughout this period, as can be seen by the
results of the shuffle analyses in these figures. Evidence for predictions are of course the primary
focus of these analyses, and we find that participants in all the conditions with event sortals that
can be represented by one-place predicates succeed in spontaneously grasping and generalizing
the regularity that underlies the target event sortals for their group.
Third, although not a primary focus of our analysis, and although we do not characterize
this in detail, we find that, for both one- and two-place predicate groups across the adult
experiments, there is a better anticipatory response for those sub-groups for whom the event
sortal had the dog as the subject/agent. Interestingly, previous studies have shown that
2-year-olds were inconsistent in their preference for animate entities in agent roles in acting out
reversible transitive sentences (Chapman & Kohn, 1978). In fact, Gelman & Koenig (2001)
propose that children only link animacy and agency between the ages of three and five years.
Animacy is used as a probabilistic cue to agentivity in adult sentence processing (e.g. Primus,
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2012), though Lowder & Gordon (2015) have recently questioned whether it is really animacy
or rather more general natural forces.
Fourth, by comparing verbal shadowing of an audiobook, and “shadowing” of simple
sequences of letters and numbers, we find that only the former and not the latter appears to
impact concept formation and generalization of a two-place predicate event sortal. Given the
various shared resources between the two types of shadowing, including presumably various
attentional and memory systems like the phonological loop, the results point to a role specifically
of the structure-building, grammatical properties of language, which we hypothesize to be
critically required for representing such complex concepts. At the very least, a comparison of the
one- and two-place predicate adult groups very convincingly demonstrates the much greater ease
by which adults grasp and generalize the former, compared to the latter.
However, we must also acknowledge certain shortcomings of these experiments. The most
crucial is identifying the period during a trial when participants, whether infants or adults, might
make correct anticipatory looks towards the side of the upcoming target. Theoretically, once the
participant has figured out the event sortal, then there is sufficient evidence in the very first
animation to indicate the correct side. That is, since we always animate the left video first,
participants can already judge whether that video matches the target event sortal description; if
yes, then they know that the target will be on the left, and if not, on the right. Therefore, the time
period during a trial for when anticipatory looks could be made is anywhere from the middle of
the first video to the end of the anticipatory period. Indeed, the choice of the duration of the
anticipatory period was designed to be on the higher side for infant studies because of the
novelty of the paradigm. Similarly, given the novelty of our paradigm, we justify our use of the
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entire (for adults) or the first half of (for infants) of the anticipatory period based on the shuffle
analysis. Note that for a given trial, the shuffle analysis uses all the data points, while the linear
models use only the mean, and in that sense the two analyses do not use the same data twice,
although temporal correlations between eye gaze positions across a trial remain a potential
concern in terms of the independence of the two analyses.
Finally, we turn to qualifications of the claim that the task entails representation of a
reversible transitive proposition to capture the event. The stimulus design rules out most
low-level perceptual alternatives. But even with this contrast, the “event sortal” being formed is
ambiguous. We took care to note that we do not know how a participant might code the event: is
it dog push car, or animal push vehicle, or natural kind do something to artifact? Within this
design we could not arrange a contrast where say, a dog pushed a train, or a horse pushed a car
instead, or a dog kissed a car, unless we continued for many more trials. Even then, a novel
participant would undoubtedly perturb looking times. However, we do know that a subject must
register what is encoded in the syntax of all natural languages, namely the causal direction of an
event between two possible agents. Similarly, in the intransitive case, the event could be e.g.,
“dog rolling”, or “animal doing action”, or less. We did not have contrasts where the action was
other than rolling, or the dog was something else. Note also that intransitives can be thought of
as modifiers of the subject: a dog rolling is a rolling dog, that is, a subset of dogs. Is it more
complex than say, a brown dog? The true scope of both generalizations remains for future work
to explore.
To sum up: we now know that infants in the second year of life can recognize individual
object sortals on the basic of shape and function, and also recognize kinds of objects (Xu, 2007;
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Futó et al, 2010). Furthermore, they understand prelinguistically which objects in a scene are
primary and which are inessential to a given event (Gordon, 2003). They can discriminate a
change in agency in a transitive action (Golinkoff & Kerr, 1978). Our study shows that they can
form a category of intransitive events where the actors change but remain members of the same
kind. What infants of this age cannot do is form a category of transitive events in which the
agents change but remain members of a kind.
Many studies remain to clarify this finding. For example, if the task was match-to-sample,
with no requirements on memory, would infants or shadowing adults easily match the original
transitive event despite the agents changing? If language accompanied the stimuli, would infants
succeed in maintaining attention across trials to the correct event?
In a series of papers, Hinzen argues that only a human brain comes equipped with the
machinery necessary to create syntactic structures, and hence propositional assertions. He
describes how the syntactic operations of external and internal Merge create a new kind of
meaning, e.g. (DOG (PUSH CAR)). In other words,
“..there is a kind of meaning that only arises with and within grammatical structures –
grammar is transformative for what kinds of meaning there are.” (Hinzen, 2017, p. 17)
We argue that the evidence from infants and adults is compatible with a radical claim about the
role of language in the formation of a similarity class of events. Reversible transitive events fall
under a propositional description, such that the similarity across them is captured by a syntactic
string rather than a label. The results of the experiment reported here suggest that participants
viewing such events can only see the resemblance that ties them together if they have access to
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grammar, both because they are old enough to have such grammatical distinctions (i.e. beyond
24 months old), and without grammatical interference from a secondary task.
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Figure 1

Figure 1. The time-line of an individual trial (a video version of the first trial is available at
https://youtu.be/Qwo3OsTyIiA). The four pairs of images are screenshots at different moments
during a single trial video. In all trials the left gray-scaled video animates first, followed by the
right gray-scaled video. After an anticipatory period, the video depicting the target predicate for
that participant animates in color, accompanied by a happy jingle.
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Figure 2

Figure 2. Adult participants (N=18) succeed in generalizing a reversible 2-place predicate in the
absence of verbal shadowing. X-axis is trial time (sec) and y-axis is distance of the gaze point
from center along the horizontal eyetracker axis, with 0 representing screen center. The lighter,
thinner line (the line entirely above zero, i.e., to the right of center, in the post-anticipatory
period) is the mean gaze x-position for trials where, following the anticipatory period, the target
was on the right, while the darker, thicker line is the corresponding mean gaze x-position for the
trials where the target was on the left. The x-extent of the rectangle between ~7sec-10sec marks
the anticipatory period. The row of dots (running together into several line segments) at the
bottom of the graph mark stretches of time that are significant by the bootstrap method (see Data
analysis section for Experiment 1).
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Figure 3

Figure 3: Adult participants(N=20) fail to generalize a reversible 2-place when simultaneously
verbal shadowing an audiobook. As in Figure 2, x-axis is trial time (seconds) and y-axis is mean
gaze position on screen, with 0 representing screen center. The gaze pattern for target-on-left and
target-on-right trials is only significantly different in the post-anticipatory period.
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Figure 4

Figure 4. Group-wise results for the two-place predicate experiment with adult participants,
showing mean gaze position (estimated marginal means ±95% Confidence Intervals) during the
anticipatory period for trials when the upcoming target location is to the left or the right on the
screen, for each combination of the specific predicate used (rows) and the presence/absence of
verbal shadowing (columns), An “ideal” anticipation pattern is seen in the Dog-push-Car, No
shadowing group, where the mean gaze x-position during the anticipatory period is significantly
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lower (i.e., significantly more left-wards) for the Target on left trials compared to the mean gaze
position during the anticipatory period for the Target on right trials.
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Figure 5

Figure 5: 12-24-mo-old infants (N=20) fail to generalize a reversible two-place predicate. As in
the previous figures for adult participants, x-axis is trial time (seconds) and y-axis is mean gaze
position on screen, with 0 representing screen center. The gaze pattern for target-on-left and
target-on-right trials is only significantly different in the post-anticipatory period.
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Figure 6

Figure 6. Adult participants (N=14) succeed in generalizing a one-place predicate in the absence
of verbal shadowing. The shuffle analysis indicates significant difference between the
target-on-left and target-on-right eye gaze patterns starting before the onset of the anticipatory
period (box).
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Figure 7

Figure 7: Adult participants (N=18) succeed in generalizing a one-place predicate even when
verbally shadowing an audiobook. The shuffle analysis indicates significant difference between
the target-on-left and target-on-right eye gaze patterns starting before the onset of the
anticipatory period (box), similar to the no-shadowing version of this experiment.
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Figure 8

Figure 8. Group-wise results for the one-place predicate experiment with adult participants,
showing mean gaze position (estimated marginal means ±95% Confidence Intervals) during the
anticipatory period for trials when the upcoming target location is to the left or the right on the
screen, for each combination of the specific predicate used (rows) and the presence/absence of
verbal shadowing (columns). All cells show significant, correct anticipatory looking patterns:
significantly higher mean gaze x-positions during anticipation for the Target on right trials.
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Figure 9

Figure 9. Infants (12-24-mo-olds, N=17) show significant correct anticipations, signaling
successful generalization of a one-place predicate. As in comparable figures from the previous
experiment, the light and dark lines are the mean gaze x-positions for target-on-right and
target-on-left trials respectively, the box marks the anticipatory period, and the row of dots at the
bottom mark stretches of time that are significant by the bootstrap method. The anticipatory
effect is primarily in the first half of the anticipatory period.

66

Figure 10

Figure 10. Infant data for the one-place predicate experiment (A) and the two-place predicate
experiment (B), shown side-by-side. The mean gaze position during the anticipatory period is
significantly higher (i.e., more to the right of the screen) when the upcoming target is on the
right, compared to trials when the upcoming target is to the left, only for the “simpler,” one-place
predicate experiment (A).
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Figure 11

Figure 11. Correlations between age (in months) and an ‘Anticipation score’ for infants in the
one- and two-place predicate experiments. Although both trend lines slope upwards, neither is
significant
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Figure 12

Figure 12. Adult participants (N=19) succeed in generalizing a one-place predicate when
simultaneously engaged in non-grammatical shadowing. The shuffle analysis indicates
significant difference between the target-on-left and target-on-right eye gaze patterns starting
well before the onset of the anticipatory period (box), before the second video even begins to
animate.
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Figure 13

Figure 13 Adult participants (N=16) also succeed in generalizing a two-place predicate when
simultaneously engaged in non-grammatical shadowing, although the shuffle analysis indicates a
relatively smaller effect, compared to the one-place predicate group (see Figure 11).
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Figure 14

Figure 14. Group-wise results of two-way contrasts, for the one-place (A) and two-place (B)
predicate experiments respectively, where adult participants underwent non-grammatical
shadowing, showing estimated marginal means (±95% Confidence Intervals) of gaze x-location
during the anticipatory period. Both (A) and (B) show an overall anticipation effect, with the
combined mean gaze x-positions significantly more to the right for Target on right trials,
compared to Target on left trials.
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